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Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role for countries or regions in the 
process of economic catching-up. It is normally regarded as an important source of private 
capital and a contribution to growth and employment. Especially in “classical” developing 
countries, the attraction of FDI has often been part of their developing strategy – with 
different results of course (OECD, 2002; Moran, 1998). Since the beginning of transition, 
hopes are also based on foreign capital in the former socialist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe where FDI from the West was almost completely absent before. Similarly to 
Central and East European countries, East Germany also became a host to foreign (and 
West German) private investments with the beginning of transition. Today, nearly all big 
industrial investments in East Germany stem from West Germany or abroad. Well known 
examples for foreign investments in East Germany are Dow Chemical in Schkopau, Elf 
Aquitaine in Leuna, or AMD in Dresden. Major West German investments are e.g. BMW 
in Leipzig, Bayer in Bitterfeld, or Volkswagen in Dresden. 
From the perspective of the host economies, it is not only the capital transfer as such that 
makes foreign (and in East Germany also West German) investments so attractive but also 
and especially the transfer of modern technology and know how. Like in Central East 
European countries and other catching-up economies, it is expected in East Germany that 
modern equipped foreign (West German) investors increase productivity, which in East 
Germany still lags clearly behind the Western part of the country and constitutes an ongoing 
developing problem.1 Thereby it is not only the transfer of technology from the parent 
company to the subsidiary but also the hope that subsidiaries build a source of technology 
spillovers in favor of local firms. These expectations raise the question of technological 
capability of foreign (West German) investors. Are external investors in East Germany 
really characterized by technological superiority compared to pure East German firms? Do 
they innovate more? Are they stronger involved in R&D (if at all)? Do they finally perform 
better in terms of productivity? These and further aspects will be dealt with in this paper.2 
                                                 
1  Since the mid 1990s, the process of productivity catching-up between East and West Germany has nearly 
come to a hold. In 2002, East Germany reached 72% of West Germany’s productivity in manufacturing 
industry (DIW Berlin/IAB/IfW/IWH/ZEW, 2003, 15). 
2  There exist two empirical studies that deal with the performance of external investors in East Germany 
(Bellmann/Ellguth/Jungnickel,  2002; Belitz/Brenke/Fleischer, 2000). Bellmann/Ellguth/Jungnickel 
(2002) concentrate on differences between foreign (West German) establishments and East German 
establishments with respect to productivity. Direct indicators of technological capability are not subject to 
their paper. The study of Belitz/Brenke/Fleischer (2000) is about the impact of foreign investors on 
competitive market structures in East Germany. Aspects of technological capability play a minor role and 




In the following, there will be an overview about the development of FDI in East Germany 
based on official data provided by the Federal Bank of Germany. The investigation will also 
include a comparison to Central East European countries. But the focus of the paper will be 
the analysis of a representative enterprise survey, the IAB-establishment panel, which 
provides a number of variables on the technological capability of (majority) foreign, West 
German, and East German owned firms. 
 
2  Technological capability of foreign subsidiaries – theoretical 
considerations 
There is no lack of theories explaining the existence of FDI or rather the existence of 
multinational companies. A whole spectrum of theoretical explanations has been developed 
since the 1960s when foreign subsidiaries became more and more important in practice.3 
The different theoretical explanations that developed over time have been integrated by 
Dunning (1993, 75ff) in the so called OLI-paradigm. It has become the standard theoretical 
framework for studies on foreign subsidiaries.4 The OLI-paradigm shows under which 
circumstances a parent company establishes a foreign subsidiary instead of entering the 
foreign market via export or via licensing to a local producer. According to Dunning, three 
conditions (O, L, I) must be fulfilled before FDI takes place. First, the potential foreign 
investor – compared to the firms in the foreign market – must have ownership-advantages 
(e.g. firm specific product or production technology, marketing strategies). In order to 
regard production within the foreign market more efficient than export, a second condition 
must be given. That is, the aspired foreign country must offer locational-advantages (e.g. 
lower taxes, lower wages, cheap access to raw material). However, as it could still be more 
efficient to have a local company within the foreign market produce via license-agreement, 
a third condition must be fulfilled before a subsidiary will be established abroad. That is, 
the potential foreign investor must face internalization-advantages, which means that it 
must be more efficient for the foreign investor to make use of the firm specific technology 
within the multinational concern through a subsidiary because asymmetric information 
                                                 
3  Major contributions came from Hymer (1960) who stressed “monopolistic” advantages as a driving force 
behind foreign subsidiaries, Vernon (1966) who emphasized the product cycle as a significant reason for 
the relocation of production from industrialized to less developed economies, and finally exponents of the 
internalization theory stressed the imperfections of technology markets (e. g. Buckley/Casson, 1976 and 
1985; Rugman, 1980 and 1985).For an overview about the theoretical approaches explaining 
multinational firms (not FDI as a macro variable) see e. g. Caves (1996) or Dunning (1993, 68ff). 
4  Barz (1998), Autschbach (1997), Klagge (1997) and many others base their empirical research on the 




makes license-agreements impossible (failure of technology markets).5 Only if all three 
conditions, i. e. ownership-, locational-, and internalization-advantages, are given a firm 
will establish a foreign subsidiary instead of engaging in export or license agreements. 
Dunning’s theoretical framework has of course primarily been developed in order to explain 
the existence of multinational firms, but by doing so it lies the very foundation for the 
assumption that foreign subsidiaries are technologically superior compared to domestic 
firms. The firm specific technology (ownership advantages) “packed” (internalized) in a 
foreign subsidiary makes foreign investors a source of new technology and knowledge 
within the host economy. More generally speaking, foreign subsidiaries benefit from the 
competitive strength (ownership advantages) of their parent company worldwide. 
3  FDI in East Germany: overview based on official statistics 
3.1  Methodical remarks 
In Germany, the Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) is responsible for the collection of 
FDI data. There are two methods of FDI data collection in Germany (flow and stock). Flow 
data is collected by the Federal Bank for the purpose of national accounts (balance of 
payments), but these figures do not allow for a breakdown between East and West 
Germany. Thus, they are not suitable for this paper. The collection of stock data, however, 
is based on the foreign subsidiary’s balance sheets and therefore allows for a regional 
breakdown between East and West Germany (East and West German Länder). The legal 
basis for stock data collection is the German foreign trade regulation (Außen-
wirtschaftsverordnung). Since the beginning of 1999, foreign ownerships of more than 10% 
are subject to registration (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003, 71).6 With the 10% rule, German 
FDI statistics finally meets the international recommendations for FDI data collection given 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1993). The compulsory registration of FDI 
according to the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung applies to enterprises with a balance sheet 
total of at least 500 000 Euro.  
                                                 
5  Thus, internalization has nothing to do with external effects here. It simply means that certain technolo-
gies or know how is being transferred internally (within the multinational concern). 
6  In September 1989, the threshold had been changed from 25% to 20%. It is reasonable to assume that 
these changes (from 25% to 20% and from 20% to 10%) cause problems when comparing German FDI 
stock data over time. But according to calculations of the Federal Bank of Germany, the changes have not 
caused much falsification first of all because most FDI has been invested in 100% foreign owned 




Since balance sheets are used for stock data collection it is possible to determine the lo-
cation of FDI. However, the Federal Bank records FDI only at the principal office 
(rechtlicher Sitz) of the foreign investor. It is not possible to separately account for es-
tablishments (local business units) that in turn are founded somewhere else in Germany. 
This may cause distortions when looking at regional FDI data. For example, an estab-
lishment in East Germany deriving from a foreign investor’s principal office in West 
Germany is not being identified as FDI in East Germany. In other words, only investments 
that are coming immediately from abroad can be counted as FDI in East Germany. Since it 
is probable that a number of foreign investments in East Germany have been carried out by 
foreign firms that have traditionally been located in West Germany the method of data 
collection causes an underestimation of FDI in East Germany.7 
Box 1: FDI in East Germany’s privatization process 
In the early years of transition, a large part of FDI came to East Germany within the pri-
vatization process. In East Germany, the Treuhandanstalt (trust agency) was responsible for 
the privatization of state owned enterprises which was completed by the end of 1994. 
However, reliable figures on the total sum of investment carried out by foreign firms within 
the privatization process is hard to come by and if so figures would be difficult to 
interpretate. Purchase prices did often not reflect the value of the firms and after all pur-
chase prices were often only a symbolic price when the buyer made investment and em-
ployment promises. Thus, privatization effects can rather be expressed in terms of number 
of privatization projects and investment promises: In October 1994, foreign investors 
accounted for 855 out of 14 576 (6%) privatization projects but their investment promises 
were as high as 11% of all investment promises which indicates that foreign investors were 
mostly present in the privatization of big firms (Haas, 1996, 166f). Treuhand data will, 
however, not be used in this paper. 
3.2  The development of FDI in East Germany (1991-2001)8 
In East Germany, FDI of course started from a very low level in 1991 and increased 
substantially in the following years (from 665 Mio. Euro in 1991 to 9 429 Mio. Euro in 
                                                 
7  The underestimation problem can of course also happen the other way around. That means, foreign firms 
investing immediately in East Germany and founding establishments (local business units) in West 
Germany in the course of time. However, it is more likely that FDI is underestimated in East Germany 
since West Germany has a longer tradition in the attraction of foreign firms. About the difficulties of 
regional FDI data for East and West Germany see also Votteler (2001,142ff). 
8  Data presented in this chapter derive from the Federal Bank of Germany. They are consolidated figures, 
that means data corrected for FDI that only goes into holdings in Germany and is afterwards invested 




2001), but since 1998 the FDI stock more or less stagnates as shown in chart 1 the FDI 
stock even declined slightly in the year 2001. 
 
Chart 1: 
FDI stock in East Germany
a 1991-2001 (end of year) 








1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 
a excluding Berlin. 
Source:  Federal Bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank). 
The shape of the curve in chart 1 has strongly been affected by the development of FDI in 
Sachsen-Anhalt. Different from other federal states (Länder), Sachsen-Anhalt experienced a 
strong increase of FDI in 1995 and 1997 while it has been decreasing since 1999   






FDI stock in East Germany
a 1991-2001 (end of year) 













a excluding Berlin. 
Source:  Federal Bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank). 
Overall, Sachsen-Anhalt has attracted by far the highest amount of FDI until the end of 
2001 (3 387 Mio. Euro), followed by Brandenburg (1 932 Mio. Euro), Sachsen (1 612 Mio. 
Euro), and Thüringen (1  412 Mio. Euro). Least has been invested in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (1 086 Mio. Euro). When taking into account the size of the Länder (in terms 
of number of inhabitants), Sachsen-Anhalt remains the leading region with 1 312 Euro per 
head (see table 1). It follows Brandenburg (745 Euro) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (617 
Euro) – whereby the latter received substantial foreign investments in the shipbuilding 
industry (e. g. Aker from Norway). 
Table 1: 
FDI stock in the East German Länder in Mio. Euro and per head, 2001 
  FDI stock in Mio. Euro 
2001 
FDI per head in Euro 
2001 
Brandenburg  1 932  745 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  1 086  617 
Sachsen  1 612  368 
Sachsen-Anhalt  3 387  1 312 
Thüringen  1 412  586 
East Germany (excl. Berlin)  9 429  687 




The comparably high FDI stock in Sachsen-Anhalt certainly reflects the big foreign in-
vestments in chemical industry and petroleum industry that have been undertaken here (e.g. 
Dow Chemical, Elf Aquitaine). Privatization ended by the end of 1994, and afterwards 
substantial investments have been carried out especially in the chemical industry. The 
strong shrinking of FDI stock in Sachsen-Anhalt in 2000 (from 5 231 to 3 651 Mio. Euro) is 
more difficult to explain. Looking at the FDI figures by branches for Sachsen-Anhalt (see 
appendix 1) it shows that the decrease of about 1.6 billion Euro between 1999 and 2000 
took place in manufacturing industry, but within manufacturing industry it was not 
chemical industry that experienced a shrinking of FDI stock. In chemical industry the FDI 
stock even increased from 1999 to 2000. From those branches for which FDI figures are 
documented the following three experienced a decreasing FDI stock: “Non-metallic mineral 
products”, “Fabricated metal products”, and “Real estate, renting and business activities not 
elsewhere classified”.9 In general, a decreasing FDI stock may either mean the relocation of 
investors or it reflects repayments of loans to the parent company, profit transfer to the 
parent company or other financial transfers that statistically count as an FDI outflow. 
Official statistics do, however, not allow to identify the “form” of FDI outflow. 
The relatively low FDI stock in Sachsen as shown in table 1 is certainly misleading since a 
number of very important industrial investments have been carried out in Sachsen. It is 
reasonable to assume that there are foreign investment projects that are not counted since 
the investing foreign firm has its main office in another federal state. And of course, West 
German investments as such are not included in official FDI statistics, but in Sachsen there 
are significant investments from West German investors, e.g. Infineon, Porsche, 
Volkswagen and numerous components suppliers like Bosch, Brose etc. 
 
 
                                                 
9  In order to avoid the disclosure of single investment projects the Federal Bank of Germany is not allowed 




Box 2: Development of FDI in Berlin 
One problem that arises when locking at FDI (and other) data for East Germany is the 
question how to treat Berlin since official statistics do usually not allow to differentiate 
between East and West Berlin. Because of its special situation, Berlin has been excluded 
from the FDI statistics in this chapter. It will, however, be treated separately at this point 
since it took a rather special and interesting development (chart 3). First, FDI took a de-
velopment comparable to the five East German Länder although it started from a higher 
level. But in 1997/98, when FDI began to stagnate in East Germany, Berlin in turn ex-
perienced a strong increase of FDI. As a result, FDI in Berlin clearly exceeds the total 
amount of FDI in East Germany by the end of 2001, namely 11 573 Mio. Euro in Berlin 
versus 9 429 Mio. Euro in East Germany (see also appendix 2).  
Chart 3: 
FDI stock in East Germany including/excluding Berlin 1991-2002 
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Source: Federal Bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank). 
 
The strong increase of FDI in Berlin since 1997 took place because of the relocation of the 
capital city from Bonn to Berlin. According to the Federal Bank of Germany and the 
International Investment Council (IIC) Berlin10 a number of foreign firms decided to relo-
cate their main office to Berlin, and as mentioned before FDI counts at the place (federal 
state) where the main office is located even if production takes place in local business units 
somewhere else. 
                                                 
10  The IIC is an investment promotion agency for East Germany founded in 1997. The stakeholders of the 
IIC are the German Federal Government and the five East German states plus Berlin. For further 





By the end of 2001, 7 385 Million Euro of the 9 429 Million Euro that have been invested 
in East Germany by foreign firms have gone into manufacturing industry, i. e. 78.3% (see 
table 2). Unfortunately, a further breakdown by branches is rather incomplete for reasons of 
data protection. What is striking, however, is the fact that a large part of FDI in 
manufacturing industry has been invested in chemical industry (35.2% of all foreign direct 
investments in manufacturing industry). 
Table 2: 
FDI stock in East Germany
a according to branches 2001 (end of year) 
Branches 
Million 
Euro  % 
Manufacturing industry  7 385  78.3 
Food, beverages, tobacco  X  X 
Paper, publishing, printing  X  X 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products  -  - 
Chemical industry  2 599  35.2 
Rubber, plastic products  X  X 
Non-metallic mineral products  X  X 
Basic metals  704  9.5 
Fabricated metal products  X  X 
Machinery, equipment  131  1.8 
Manufacture of devices for electricity production and distribution  X  X 
Optical equipment  X  X 
Motor vehicle production  739  10.0 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles etc.  214  2.3 
Transport, communication  267  2.8 
Financial intermediation  16  0.2 
Credit institutions  -  - 
Other financial institutions  X  X 
Insurance industry  X  X 
Real estate, renting and business activities n.e.c.  553  5.9 
Real estate activities  X  X 
Services mainly for enterprises  178  32.2 
Management activities of holding companies (Beteiligungsgesell-
schaften)  223  40.3 
Others  994  10.5 
Total  9 429  100 
X = not declared in order to avoid the disclosure of single investment projects 
a excluding Berlin 




3.3   FDI in East Germany compared to CEEC 
Not very surprisingly, FDI stock in East Germany remains low compared to West Germany. 
In West Germany, FDI per head has been much higher than in East Germany, namely 3 651 
Euro per head in West Germany versus 690 Euro per head in East Germany. But thereby 
one has to take into account that West Germany has been accumulating FDI over decades 
while in East Germany it started only with the beginning of transition. 
In order to compare East Germany’s FDI stock to other regions or countries, it is more 
reasonable to make a comparison to Central European countries which also have been 
attracting foreign investors since the beginning of transition in 1990. Such a comparison is 
of course not free of problems related to the data collection procedures. 
First of all, there are the generally known difficulties with respect to the international 
comparability of FDI statistics (Döhrn, 1996; Sachverständigenrat, 1997, 64ff). Never-
theless, the harmonization of FDI data collection has improved substantially in recent years, 
also and especially in Central European countries (Borrmann, 2003). Most important, today 
all Central European countries listed in table 3 (as well as Germany) apply the 10% 
threshold for the definition of FDI as recommended by the IMF and OECD (IMF, 1993; 
OECD, 1996).11  
Furthermore, East German FDI statistics do not include investments from West Germany as 
mentioned earlier in this paper. In order to achieve a better data comparability, German FDI 
has been excluded from FDI figures for Central East European Countries. 
Finally, table 3 presents FDI stock data for eight Central European countries and East 
Germany. Looking at the FDI stock in absolute figures (table 3), Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland by far exceed East Germany. When taking into account the size of the country 
(region) by looking at FDI stock per head, it shows that all Central European countries still 
exceed East Germany. 
                                                 
11  Some Central European countries used higher thresholds before, e.g. Estonia applied the 20% threshold 
until the end of 1999, Slovenia used a 50% threshold between 1997 and 1999. Consequently, FDI has 





FDI stock in East Germany and Central European countries 2001 
 FDI  stock 
Mio. US $ 
FDI stock per head  
US $ 
East Germany (without Berlin)  8 414  690 
Czech Republic
a  26 764  2 012 
Estonia
a  3 160  2 263 
Hungary
a  23 562  1 517 
Slovenia
a  3 209  1 432 
Poland
a  41 031  862 
Slovak Republic
a  5 582  803 
Latvia
a  2 332  880 
Lithuania
a  2 666  696 
a excluding German FDI. 
Source: Federal Bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank); WIIW (2003) 
One has of course to take into account that the relatively low FDI rate in East Germany has 
to do with the underestimation problem as explained above (see chapter 3.1). Furthermore, 
East Berlin has not been taken into account since official statistics do not allow for a 
breakdown between East and West Berlin. But even if whole Berlin would be included, 
which in turn would be an overestimation, East Germany (with 1 095 US $ per head) would 
still lag clearly behind the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia. 
Whether the relatively high amounts of FDI in Central East European Countries, especially 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia, have been carried out at the expense of East 
Germany cannot be answered at this point, and it is not the focus of this paper. This aspect 
does, however, call for further research. 
4  Foreign and West German investors in East Germany – an 
analysis based on the IAB establishment panel 
According to the theoretical considerations expressed in chapter 2, it is assumed that 
foreign investors are characterized by a higher technological capability and thus a better 
economic performance than East German establishments, and basically the same is ex-
pected with respect to West German establishments. This chapter will investigate whether 




statistics on FDI do not allow for any analysis of technological capability. Here the IAB 
establishment panel acts as a valuable data source. 
The IAB establishment panel will be briefly introduced in the following. Then, some 
general features of foreign, West German, and East German establishments will be pre-
sented. Afterwards, the technological capability of external and East German establishments 
will be analyzed using various indicators. 
4.1  The data source: IAB establishment panel 
The IAB establishment panel is carried out annually by the Institute for Employment 
Research of the Federal Labour Services in Germany (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, IAB). It serves as the basis for empirical 
investigation on the technological potential of foreign and West German investors in East 
Germany in this paper. The panel is representative for the East German economy. All data 
presented in this chapter are projected figures. The basic population from which the sample 
is drawn is the employment statistics register of the Federal Employment Services 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit). The register includes all establishments in Germany with at 
least one employee who is obliged to social insurance contribution. That means, survey unit 
is the establishment (local business unit) and not the enterprise as a whole. This is a 
particular strength of the survey especially when making investigations in the East German 
economy, because a number of West German based enterprises have established 
subsidiaries in East Germany. The response rate usually reaches as much as 70% since field 
interviewers are send out. In 2001, the number of properly filled in questionnaires for the 
manufacturing industry amounted to 1 800 establishments for East Germany. For each case 
the IAB provides a weighting factor.12 
The IAB is a data base that allows to distinguish between majority foreign, majority West 
German and majority East German owned establishments.13 It provides general business 
indicators (e.g. sales, employment, investments) as well as indicators of the technological 
capacity (e.g. innovations, research & development, organizational changes). Research & 
development and innovation questions have been subject to the IAB establishment panel 
every third year (so far in 1998 and 2001). Latest figures will be used in this paper. 
                                                 
12  For further methodical information about the IAB establishment panel see Kölling (2000). 
13  Accordingly, the terms „foreign establishment (firm)”, „West German establishment (firm)“, and “East 
German establishment (firm)” will be used in the following. Foreign and West German establishments 




Different from official statistics, the IAB establishment panel for East Germany includes the 
Eastern part of Berlin which contributes to data accuracy. 
All figures calculated from the IAB establishment panel and presented below apply to 
manufacturing industry in East Germany. 
4.2 General features of external and East German establishments 
According to the IAB establishment panel 2001, majority foreign owned establishments in 
East Germany account for only 1.6% of all establishments in the East German manu-
facturing industry while West German investors amounted to 15%. Nevertheless, foreign 
(West German) establishments represent relatively high proportions of employment, sales, 
and investments compared to East German establishments as shown in   
table 4. 
Table 4: 
Proportion of foreign, West German, and East German establishments according to 
number of firms, employment, sales, and investments in East Germany 2001 
- in % -  









Foreign establishments  1.6  9.7  18.9  15.2 
West German establishments  15.0  37.8  46.2  47.4 
East German establishments  80.4  47.5  30.0  34.4 
Other establishments
a 3.0  5.0  4.9  3.0 
a  Other establishments are majority public owned establishments, establishments without a majority owner, or estab-
lishments where the majority owner is unknown.. 
Source: IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
These figures already indicate that external investors, especially foreign establishments, are 
much bigger in terms of number of employees than East German establishments. Together 
they account for 16.6% of all establishments but represent nearly 50% of the total 
employment, 65% of sales, and 63% of investments. And indeed, as shown in table 5 the 
average size of foreign establishments is about ten times higher than the size of East 




Table 5:  
Average size of foreign, West German, and East German establishments (in terms of 
employees) 2001 
  Average size (number of employees) 
Foreign establishments  123 
West German establishments  52 
East German establishments  12 
All establishments in East Germany  20 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
Looking at the branch structure of external investors and East German establishments (see 
chart 4) it becomes visible that “fabricated metal products” and “food, beverages and 
tobacco” are by far the most important branches for East German establishments (22.7% 
and 18.8% respectively).14 The most important branches for external investors are 
“machinery, equipment” (13.6%), “paper, publishing & wood” (13.0%), and “fabricated 
metal products” (12.7%). If employees build the base for the breakdown by branches the 
picture does not change much (see appendix 3). 
                                                 
14  For the analysis by branches, foreign and West German investors had to be put together into one category 
(external investors) because of the otherwise insufficient number of cases (projection normally requires at 
least 30 cases). For the same reason, the otherwise single categories “motor vehicles/trailer/semi trailers” 
and “other transport equipment” had to be merged to “vehicle construction”. The same applies to 
“paper/publishing/printing” and “wood/wood products” which form a single category here. Except for 
these two jointed branches the categories in chart 4 correspond to the WZ 93 two-digit classification 





External (foreign and West German) investors and East German establishments 
according to branches in manufacturing industry, 2001 





























0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0
Food, beverages, tobacco













East German establishments External investors
 
* Merged categories (see footnote 14). 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
The breakdown of external and East German establishments by branches implies that 
external investors are more present in branches with a higher technology intensity. External 
investors, for example, have a clearly higher weight in branches like “chemical industry” or 
“electrical equipment” than East German establishments. East German establishments on 
the other hand are more present in “food, beverages, tobacco” or “textiles, textile products, 
leather”. The proportion of foreign, West German, and East German establishments in the 
high-, medium-, and low-tech sector will be subject to the investigations on technological 
capacity presented in the following chapter. 
Overall, the size and branch structure of external investors as well as their contribution to 
employment, sales, and investments is typical for transition economies (Hunya, 2002). It is 




over by foreign or West German investors since East Germans did not have the financial 
means to buy and modernize the existing industrial firms. 
4.3  Technological capability of external and East German establishments 
The IAB establishment panel provides a number of variables that are suitable to express the 
technological capability of firms. In the following, there will first be an analysis of external 
and East German establishments according to low-, medium- and high-tech branches as 
well as an analysis of the technical condition of equipment. Afterwards, innovation and 
R&D activities as well as the human capital potential of external and East German 
establishments will be looked at. Finally, differences in economic performance 
(productivity) will be taken into consideration. 
4.3.1  Low-, Medium- and High-Tech branches and technical condition of equipment 
The very concept of how to classify low-, medium-, and high-tech is subject to an ongoing 
debate (Carroli/Pol/Robertson, 2000; Krockow, 2002; OECD, 1999). A frequently used 
classification relies on the OECD concept which distinguishes between high-tech, medium-
high-tech, medium-low-tech, and low-tech (Hatzichronoglou, 1997).15 However, the OECD 
approach requires data with a breakdown up to 4-digit ISIC (NACE) branches, which is 
very often not available. In such cases, the statistical office of the EU (Eurostat) uses a 
modified version of the OECD classification (e.g. Foyn, 2001). High-tech and medium-
high-tech are put together to high-tech, and medium-low-tech is renamed to medium-tech. 
Low-tech remains unchanged (see appendix 4). Since the IAB establishment panel only 
provides 2-digit WZ-93 classes (comparable to 2-digit ISIC or NACE classes), this paper 
uses the modified OECD classification as suggested by Foyn (2001). Apart from this, 
another problematic aspect of the classification is that foreign (West German) investors 
often source out the labor intensive parts of their production which do not necessarily 
represent the technology intensity of that branch. Overall, the classification used here is a 
compromise but it is the only possible solution with the available data. 
                                                 
15   The debate about a reasonable definition of high-tech first of all brings up the question whether high-tech 
industries are industries that extensively produce or extensively use technology. The OECD classification 
takes into account both “the level of technology specific to the sector (measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to value added) and the technology embodied in purchases of intermediate and capital 





Foreign, West German and, East German establishments according to low-, medium-, 
and high-tech 2001 





External investors  34.6  25.0  40.4 
East German establishments  43.3  35.7  21.0 
a Low-tech: Food, beverages, tobacco; textiles, textile products, leather; paper, publishing, printing; wood, wood products; 
non-metallic mineral products; recycling. – 
b Medium-tech: Rubber, plastic products; basic metals; fabricated metal 
products; furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. – 
c High-tech: chemicals, chemical products (incl. petroleum processing which 
actually belongs to medium-tech); machinery, equipment; motor vehicles; other vehicles (including ship building which 
actually belongs to medium-tech); electrical equipment; optical equipment. 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
As presented in table 6, the majority of external investors fall into the high-tech category 
(40.4%) while among the East German establishments only 21.0% fall into high-tech 
branches. East German establishments are mainly present in low-tech branches with 43.3%. 
In this context, another aspect of technological capability will be looked at, namely the 
technical condition of equipment. It relies on a self assessment of the firms.16 In the ques-
tionnaire, the technical condition could be evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5 whereby 1 = “state-
of-the-art” and 5 = “completely outdated”.  
As shown in table 7, none of the establishments stated that their equipment was “completely 
outdated” (5). With respect to the other categories no big differences arise between West 
German and East German establishments, only foreign establishments evaluate the 
technical state of their equipment slightly better. 
                                                 
16   The question is „Generally speaking, how do you evaluate the technical condition of equipment com-





Technical condition of equipment (according to the self assessment of establishments) 
2001 













15.8 59.4  22.3  2.5  0 
West German 
establishments 
15.7 43.4  32.7  8.0  0 
East German 
establishments 
13.8 44.6  36.7  4.5  0 
All establishments  14.0  44.4  35.9  5.4  0 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
4.3.2  Product innovations and R&D 
With respect to product innovations, the IAB establishment panel distinguishes between 
three different types:  
a) substantial  improvement or further development of an already existing product, 
b)  introduction of products which are new to the firm, but already existent on the 
  market (enhancement of the range of products via imitation) and  
c)  introduction of completely new products (market innovation). 
Answers given to questions on innovation in the 2001 survey refer to the preceding two 
years, i.e. 1999 and 2000. Process innovations are not subject to the survey. 
This classification of product innovations largely corresponds to the international guideline 
for innovation surveys, the Oslo-Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 1997). The three types of 
innovation can be seen as a qualitative rank order of product innovations. The improvement 
and further development of still existing products is less challenging in terms of 
technological and organizational complexity than the introduction of completely new 
products. 
With respect to R&D, the IAB establishment panel refers to an existence of R&D activities 
in the relevant establishment. Further information (e.g. spending on R&D, R&D personnel) 




Table 8:  
Product innovations (1999-2000) and R&D (2001) of foreign, West German, and East 
German establishments 
- establishments in % - 













































































Source: IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
No matter what type of product innovation one looks at, West German and especially 
foreign establishments perform better than East German establishments. The differences are 
particularly striking when looking at market innovations – the most demanding form of 
product innovations. Among foreign establishments 30.2% exhibit a market innovation 
while there are only 10.8% of the East German firms that carried out a market innovation in 
1999-2000. Not very surprisingly, foreign establishments also perform better when looking 
at the features “at least one type of product innovation” and “all three types of product 
innovation” (see table 8). 
Looking at R&D, external investors – especially foreign firms – show a much higher 
proportion of establishments with R&D activities in the year 2001. Nearly half of the 
foreign establishments were involved in R&D (46.7%), while only 22.9% of the West 
German and only 10.7% of the East German establishments dealt with R&D in 2001.  
4.3.3   Organizational changes 
According to the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 1997, 54f), organizational changes build 
another form of innovations besides pure product (or process) innovations. Generally 
speaking, organizational innovations in the firm include “the introduction of significantly 
changed organizational structures, the implementation of advanced management techniques, 




(OECD/Eurostat, 1997, 54). The questionnaire of the IAB establishment panel (2001) 
differentiates between nine types of organizational changes: 
-  More in-house production 
-  More purchasing of products or services 
-  Reorganization of purchasing or distribution channels 
-  Reorganization of departments or operational functions 
-  Relocation of responsibilities or decision making downwards 
-  Introduction of teamwork or self dependent work groups 
-  Introduction of units with own cost-benefit calculation 
-  Environment related organizational changes (e.g. eco audit) 
-  Improvement of quality control 
Table 9 shows the proportion of external and East German establishments with the relevant 
organizational change. Like in the case of product innovations and R&D, external investors 
are more active with respect to each of the organizational changes except “more in-house 
production”. It may of course be questionable whether the organizational changes listed in 
table 9 do necessarily contribute to a better performance of the firm. Apart from this, “more 
in-house production” and “more purchasing of products or services” are two sides of the 
medal. But still, the introduction of new or the change of existing processes or techniques 
indicates flexibility and innovativeness. Finally, 61.2% of the external but only 46.7% of 
the East German establishments exhibit at least one organizational change in 1999-2000.17 
When looking at these figures one should, however, bear in mind that East German 
establishments are much smaller than foreign and West German firms. They employ 12 
persons on average (see table 5). In such small establishments it does not really make much 
sense to ask about certain organizational changes, such as “reorganization of departments or 
operational units” or “introduction of units with own cost-benefit calculation”. 
                                                 
17  Foreign and West German establishments could not be looked at separately because of the otherwise 





Organizational changes of external and East German establishments
a 1999-2000   
- establishments in % -  




More in-house production  15.2  19.6  18.8 
























Relocation of responsibility  14.2  8.7  9.5 
Introduction of team work  9.1  7.5  7.6 
















Improvement of quality control  47.7  30.8  33.6 
At least one organizational change  61.2  46.7  48.6 
a Multiple answers were possible 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
4.3.4 Human  capital 
The IAB establishment panel allows to differentiate between several types of qualification: 
low skilled white collar employees (Angestellte für einfache Tätigkeiten), qualified white 
collar employees (Angestellte für qualifizierte Tätigkeiten), unskilled blue collar workers 
(ungelernte Arbeiter) and skilled blue collar workers (Facharbeiter). According to the 
questionnaire, low skilled employees are defined as employees without apprenticeship 
(ohne Berufsausbildung) and qualified employees are those with apprenticeship (mit 
Berufsausbildung).18 
Considering the results on technological capability presented so far, one should expect that 
foreign and West German establishments are equipped with higher qualified human capital 
than East German establishments. However, the findings presented in table 10 do not 
                                                 
18  There are two further types of employees covered in the relevant question of the IAB panel, i.e. appren-
tice and active occupants/CEOs. These two groups, however, have been left aside since they are difficult 




provide clear cut evidence for this. Actually, the expected trend only appears when looking 
at qualified employees. 
With respect to low skilled employees, foreign establishments have a lower proportion 
(1.2%) than others, but West German and East German establishments show no difference 
(3.2% or 3.3%). Looking at qualified employees, foreign and West German investors 
indeed show the expected trend, i.e. a higher proportion of qualified employees (29.8% or 
24.9%) than East German establishments with 21%. Considering unskilled workers, West 
German investors have a higher proportion (14.8%) than foreign (8.6%) and East German 
firms (12.8%), which suggests that West German establishments are more often “extended 
workbenches” of their headquarters. Looking at skilled workers, East German 
establishments exhibit the highest proportion (62.9%) compared to West German or foreign 
firms. 
Table 10: 
Foreign, West German and East German establishments according to their compo-
sition of work force 2001 
- employees in % - 
  Low skilled 
employees  
(white collar) 






































All establishments  3.1  23.7  13.3  59.8 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
Despite their relatively strong presence in low-tech branches, East German establishments 
show a composition of human capital not substantially different from foreign and West 
German investors. Probably this has to do with the high unemployment in East Germany 
which causes that qualified people work in positions that are actually below their 
qualification.19 
While the equipment with human capital does not differ substantially between East German 
and foreign as well as West German investors clear differences appear when looking at 
                                                 
19  The unemployment rate in East Germany amounted to 17.4% compared to 7.8% in West Germany in the 




advanced training offered by the establishment for their employees. Here foreign investors 
stick out with 72%. Among West German investors, 54.4% offered advanced training but in 
case of East German establishments only 33.1% offered advanced training for their 
employees in 2001. 
4.3.5  Market orientation (sales and procurement) 
Market orientation is not an immediate indicator for technological capability. However, it 
can be assumed that firms with an international trade structure face higher competition and 
are thus forced to be more active with respect to innovations. As shown in table 11, foreign 
establishments show the highest sales in foreign markets (29.5%). West German firms 
make 20.4% of their sales abroad while East German establishments sell only 9.3% of their 
sales in foreign markets. East German establishments have a clear preference for the East 
German market where they make as many as 61.3% of their sales. 
Table 11: 
Market orientation (sales) of foreign, West German, and East German establishments 
2000 
- sales in % - 
  East German market  West German market  Foreign markets 

















All  establishments  45.5 36.2 18.3 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
Table 12 provides information about regional preferences of foreign, West German, and 
East German firms with respect to procurement markets (West Germany, East Germany or 
abroad). In the questionnaire no percentage figure about the purchasing structure is 
requested but establishments are asked to state whether the relevant market is “mainly”, 
“partly” or “not” relevant for their procurement. Appendix 5 provides the answers 
(mainly/partly/none) given by the establishments for each procurement market. In order to 
present the results more concise, an index has been designed with 1 for “mainly”, 0.5 for 
“partly” and 0 for “none”. The index is shown in table 12 and can assume values between 0 





For West German establishments, East and West Germany are equally important 
procurement markets. In comparison to this, foreign firms show less propensity for West 
German markets but a clearly higher preference to foreign procurement markets. Like in the 
case of sales market orientation, East German establishments again have a priority for local 
(East German) markets. Foreign procurement markets are least important for them. 
Table 12: 
Index of market orientation of foreign, West German, and East German 
establishments with respect to procurement 2001 
  West Germany  East Germany  Abroad 
Foreign establishments  49.5  60.5 30.0 
West German establishments  62.0  62.0 15.0 
East German establishments  50.0  74.0 7.0 
All establishments  51.5  71.5 8.5 
a Index from 0 – 100 with the higher the index the more weight is attached to the relevant procurement market.  
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
4.3.6 Productivity 
Finally, productivity will be looked at as an indicator of the result (outcome) of techno-
logical potential at firm level. Higher technological capability is usually related to both 
higher value added activities and higher technical efficiency. Consequently, the better the 
technological capability the higher the productivity. 
The results show that external investors, especially the foreign firms, have a clearly higher 
productivity than East German establishments. Looking at sales per employee, foreign 
establishments exhibit a productivity that is 3.5 times that of East German establishments 
while sales productivity of West German investors is twice that of East German 
establishments. The same tendency can be observed with respect to value added 
productivity (gross value added per employee) although the gap with respect to foreign 
investors is less distinct which means a higher share of intermediate consumption. Foreign 
investors show a value added productivity that is 2.4 times higher than that of East German 
establishments. Labor productivity of West German establishments is twice that of East 




Table 13 : 
Sales productivity and value added productivity 2000 
- in 1 000 Euro -  
  Sales productivity 
(sales per employee) 
Value added productivity 
(GVA
a per employee) 
External establishments  169.7  66.9 
Foreign establishments  251.4  78.3 
West German establishments  149.7  64.2 
East German establishments  71.6  32.6 
All establishments  119.1  48.6 
a GVA = gross value added. 
Source:  IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
It is reasonable to assume that some of the higher productivity of foreign and West German 
establishments is a result of both their composition of branches and firm size. Therefore, the 
“corrected” productivity of East German establishments has been calculated supposed East 
German establishments had a branch structure and establishment size structure like external 
investors, i. e. productivity corrected for branch structure and firm size structure. 
Table 14: 
Sales productivity and labor productivity of East German establishments corrected 
for branches and enterprise size structure 2000 
- in 1 000 Euro -  
East German establishments   
Actual value  Corrected for 
branches
b 
Corrected for firm 
size
c 
Sales productivity  
(sales per employee) 
71.6 86.7  91.7 
Value added productivity  
(GVA







Source: IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 
aGVA = gross value added; 
b14 branches according to chart 4; 
cFive size classes (number of employees): 1-19, 20-49, 50-
99, 100-499, >500. 
As shown in table 14, East German establishments would indeed have a higher sales 
productivity and a higher value added productivity if they would have a branch structure 
and firm size structure like external investors. But still, differences in branches and firm 
size do not fully explain the productivity gap since the corrected figures do by far not reach 
the productivity of external investors. Looking at sales (value added) productivity, 




differences in firm size structure explain 20.5% (16.6%) of the productivity gap between 
external investors and East German establishments.20 
The analysis shows that other factors not considered here may also be responsible for the 
lower productivity of East German establishments, like differences in capital intensity, 
management, internal organizational structures, access to international distribution 
networks etc. 
5   Summary and conclusions 
Official statistics on FDI show that there was a strong increase of foreign investments in 
East Germany with the beginning of transition, but since 1997 FDI stock has more or less 
come to a halt. Sachsen-Anhalt has even been characterized by a decreasing FDI stock since 
1999. Comparing FDI in East Germany to FDI in Central East European countries, East 
Germany lags clearly behind. A major reason for that is the method of data collection which 
probably underestimates FDI in East Germany and the fact that West German investments 
do not count as FDI in East Germany. At this point, the IAB establishment panel appears as 
a valuable data source since it offers the possibility to distinguish between majority foreign, 
West German, and East German owned establishments in East Germany. The survey covers 
general information on the firms as well as a number of indicators for the technological 
capability. The results show that East German establishments dominate in terms of number 
of firms (80%) but foreign and West German investors account for the majority of sales 
(together 65%) and investments (together 63%). Foreign and West German establishments 
are much bigger in terms of number of employees, and they are more present in high-tech 
branches. With respect to the technical condition of equipment (self assessment) and human 
capital potential, differences between the three groups are rather marginal. However, 
looking at product innovation, R&D, and organizational changes – the key features of 
technological capability – foreign and West German establishments perform much better 
than East German firms. Last but not least and not very surprisingly, foreign and West 
German investors also perform better with respect to productivity (sales and labor 
productivity). Even if one “corrects” the productivity of East German establishments for the 
branch and enterprise size structure of external investors, a clear productivity gap between 
the two sides remains. 
                                                 
20  It would have been of interest to control for branch structure and firm size structure simultaneously. Un-
fortunately, this has not been possible because of an insufficient number of cases. The simultaneous 
control for branches and firm size structure would require at least 30 cases in each branch/firm size 
combination, which is not given especially with respect to the firm size class >500 and branches that are 
less occupied. An addition of the above percentage figures is not acceptable since the two variables 




Because of their technological superiority and higher productivity, external investors can be 
regarded as a means to increase the technological capability and thus productivity in East 
Germany. Furthermore, they serve as a potential source of technology spillovers in favor of 
East German firms. The latter aspect calls for further research, especially in the face of the 






Appendix 1:  
FDI stock in Sachsen-Anhalt by branches 1999 and 2000 (end of year) 
- Million Euro -  
Branches  1999  2000 
Manufacturing industry  4 726  3 177 
Food, beverages, tobacco  X  X 
Paper, publishing, printing  -  - 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products  X  - 
Chemical industry  2 463  2 684 
Rubber, plastic products  25  54 
Non-metallic mineral products  179  128 
Basic metals  X  X 
Fabricated metal products  206  175 
Machinery, equipment  9  17 
Manufacture of devices for electricity production and distribution  X  X 
Optical equipment  X  X 
Motor vehicle production  9  X 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles etc.  18  18 
Transport, communication  -  - 
Financial intermediation  -  - 
Credit institutions  -  - 
Other financial institutions  -  - 
Insurance industry  -  - 
Real estate, renting and business activities n.e.c.  85  28 
Real estate activities  27  9 
Services mainly for enterprises  44  19 
Management activities of holding companies 
(Beteiligungsgesellschaften)  X  X 
Other  402  428 
Total  5 231  3 651 
Source: Federal Bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) 





Appendix 2:  
FDI stock in the East German Länder 1991-2002 (Million Euro) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Brandenburg  153  297 580 685 764 860  1021  1482  1389  1794  1932 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern  307  436 838 727 768 719 648 788 856  1092  1086 
Sachsen  102  355 801 969 857 819  1127  1263  1413  1606  1612 
Sachen-Anhalt  51  41  308  923 3010 3084 4862 5093 5231 3651 3387 
Thüringen  51  163 272 534 481 711 931 844 634  1407  1412 
East Germany 
total  665  1292 2799 3837 5880 6193 8589 9470 9523 9550 9429 
Berlin  2096  2500 3662 3494 3278 3953 4347 5259 6894 8779  11573 
Source: Federal Bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) 
Appendix 3:  
External (foreign and West German) investors and East German establishments 





























0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0
Food, beverages, tobacco













East German establishments External investors
 
Source: IAB establishment panel 2001, calculation of the IWH. 




Appendix 4:  
High-, medium-, and low-tech according to the modified OECD classification 
High-Tech
a  Aerospace industry; manufacture of office machinery and computers; 
manufacture of radio, TV, and communication equipment; pharmaceutical 
products; scientific equipment; automobiles; electrical equipment; Chemicals 
(except for pharmaceutical products); other vehicles (except for aerospace and 
shipbuilding); machinery 
Medium-Tech  Rubber and plastic products; ship building; non-metallic mineral products; basic 
metals; manufacture of refined petroleum products 
Low-Tech  Paper, publishing and printing; textile and leather products; food, beverages and 
tobacco; wood and wood products; furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. 
a Branches put in italic are those which fall into the high-tech category in the original OECD classification, the others 
originally build medium-high-tech. 
Source: Foyn (2001) 
 
Appendix 5:  
Market orientation of foreign, West German, and East German establishments with 
respect to purchasing 2001 
- establishments in % -  
West Germany  East Germany  Abroad   
mainly partly none mainly partly none mainly partly none 
Foreign 
establishments  20 59  21  32 57  10 3  54  43 
West German 
establishments  38 48  15  34 56  10 2  26  72 
East German 
establishments  22 56  22  53 42  5  1  12  87 
All establishments 
24  55 21  49  45  6  1 15  84 
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